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Restructuring in the financial markets due to deregulation and 
interstate banking has focused attention on the role the banking system plays 
in facilitating economic growth.  Consolidation in the banking industry,  with 
the growing importance of interstate banking and the current wave of mergers 
and acquisitions,  raises questions about how competition in the banking sector 
affects local economies.  The importance of local banking markets to local 
economies is demonstrated by the alleged regional impacts of the recent credit 
crunch. 
The reliance of firms on a local banking system is further suggested 
by a recent Federal Reserve survey showing that small firms (fewer than 100 
employees) and midsize firms (100 to 500 employees) rely on banks as their 
primary source of capital and credit.  Financial institutions, especially 
banks, are the primary supplier of external funds to new businesses,  which are 
typically small, independent enterprises.  Unlike midsize firms or large 
corporations, small businesses have limited access to organized open markets 
for stocks,  bonds,  and commercial paper.  Approximately three of every four 
existing small businesses have borrowed from banks.  2 
While much attention has been directed at the systematic effects of 
bank failures and financial structure on aggregate economic activity,  the 
effect of bank structure on regional economies remains an open question.  3 
This paper explores the role of local banking systems in regional development 
by measuring the effects of bank structure and profitability on the births of 
new firms.  Specifically,  we argue that local credit markets potentially 
affect firm location decisions, and we illustrate how a standard model of firm 
location could be adapted to incorporate such factors.  We then 
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econometrically test the model to measure the significance of profitability, 
concentration,  size,  and entry of a region's banking sector on regional 
growth,  as measured by business openings. 
The model is tested using a panel of 252 standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSAs) over two time periods: the first during the 
1980-82  recession, and the second during the 1984-1986  expansion.  We then 
explore the robustness of the model across the business cycle by running it on 
the two cross-sections. Finally,  we employ panel data to control for 
state-level  fixed effects associated with bank regulation. 
Our basic results are robust across these specifications and suggest 
that bank structure and profitability have significant effects on firm 
openings.  A profitable and competitive banking market is associated with a 
higher rate of firm births.  In particular, firm births are found to be 
associated with higher bank profits,  higher numbers of bank employees, lower 
levels of concentration,  higher proportions of small banks, and freer entry of 
new banks into the region.  The results suggest that policies to promote 
competition and to ensure bank profitability will benefit regional growth. 
Section I presents a standard model of firm location and extends it to 
include measures of bank structure and profitability.  Section I1 describes 
the data,  and section I11 presents results on the impact of banking on firm 
location.  Finally,  section IV presents conclusions and areas for future 
research. 
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I. A Model of Firm Location 
In this section,  we modify a standard model of firm location to 
recognize the importance of local bank structure.  The model we use was 
originally developed by Carlton (1979),  although we more closely follow Eberts 
and Stone (1987). 
We assume that owners of start-up  firms strive to maximize profits in 
the long run.  Even though start-ups  do not rely on bank financing in the 
first few years of operation, established small and midsize firms do.  The 
cost and availability of this financing will affect expected profits and thus 
will be considered when choosing a firm location.  Furthermore, the 
availability and cost of bank financing is in part a function of bank profits 
and bank market structure. 
The assumption that firms maximize profits over time can be written 
formally as 
=t  max Ct - 
(l+rIt' 
where .rrt  are the expected profits at time t and r is the appropriate 
discount rate.  Profits in any given time period are a function of the 
expected output and input prices 
where pt is a nonnegative price vector of the outputs the firm is capable of 
producing,  and wt is a nonnegative price vector of the inputs the firm 
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requires to produce those outputs.  Standard input prices would include wages, 
energy prices, land,  and capital. 
Survey evidence suggests that for small and midsize firms,  the price of 
capital is largely determined by the price of bank financing.  This price, in 
turn,  is assumed to be a function of bank profitability and bank market 
structure: 
where RETURN is net income over assets and HERF is the Herfindahl 
concentration  measure.  In forecasting values for these various variables into 
the distant future,  entrepreneurs will employ past and current values to help 
form their expectations of the future. 
For an econometric implementation,  the number of new establishments in 
a city is assumed to depend on 1) the number of potential entrepreneurs and 2) 
the probability that a given entrepreneur will start a new firm.  The higher 
the level of economic activity in a city,  the greater the number of potential 
entrepreneurs.  Also, the higher the expected profitability of new firms,  the 
larger the probability that they will actually emerge. 
Carlton (1979) modeled this birth process as a Poisson probabilistic 
model, since the birth of new establishments is a discrete event.  Let Pi  be 
the probability that a potential entrepreneur will start an establishment in a 
given city;  then let 
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is a vector of fixed coefficients,  ei is an error term composed of a Poisson 
process and random error, and M is the number of cities in the sample. 
Consistent estimates of the mean and variance of pi are given by 
where Ni is the observed number of births and Bpi is the birth potential as 
proxied by the employment rate in the SMSA.  We can obtaina  consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimate of b by using weighted least squares,  with 
weights equal to the standard error of the Poisson  process. 
We modify this technique to exploit the additional information that 
panel data provide.  With panel data,  equation (4) can  now be written as 
In  Pit = xitb + eit,  i=1,  ...,  M and t=1,  ...,  T, 
where T is the number of time series observations.  This specification allows 
for the control of unobserved fixed effects.  The problem with estimating this 
model with OLS,  however, is that in addition to being heteroscedastic,  eit may 
also be autocorrelated. 
We report estimates of equation (7) using the general approach 
described by Kmenta (1986,  pp. 616-625)  as implemented in SHAZAM.  By allowing 
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for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity,  this technique yields consistent 
and asymptotically efficient estimates of the parameters as long as there is 
some heteroscedasticity that arises separately from the birth process. 
However, if the only source of heteroscedasticity arises from the birth 
process, the technique is still consistent,  but not asymptotically efficient 
because it ignores the relationship in equation (6). 
In this case,  a two-step  estimator can  be developed by using Eberts 
and Stone's  (1987) approach to obtain consistent estimates of the weights. 
The regressors are transformed using these weights,  and the model is 
reestimated using the transformed regressors allowing for autocorrelation. 
Unfortunately, this technique requires making rather restrictive assumptions 
about how autocorrelation enters the model.  As a practical matter, the 
empirical estimates of these two techniques are very similar,  so we report 
only the estimates for the more general model.  4 
11. Data 
The independent variables typically used to measure expected 
profitability include wage rates,  tax rates,  unionization rates,  and energy 
prices.  We extend this standard list to  include measures of bank structure 
and profitability that determine,  at least in part, the price and availability 
of credit and thus expected profitability and firm openings.  In  particular, 
we include measures of the number of banks, size distribution,  concentration, 
recent entry,  and financial health. 
The panel is composed of 252 SMSAs across the country covering two 
time periods, 1980-82  and 1984-86. The dependent variable (BIRTHRATE) is the 
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natural log of the ratio of new firm births as reported in the USELM data to 
existing employment in the SMSA.'  A birth is defined as an establishment 
that did not exist in 1980 (1984) but did exist in 1982 (1986).  Births within 
these two-year  periods are treated as comparable. 
We divide the independent variables into two types.  The first are 
measures of local economic conditions,  and the second are measures of bank 
structure and profitability.  All data are measured at the SMSA level unless 
otherwise noted. 
The measures of local economic activity are the natural logs of the 
wage rate (WAGE),  number of establishments (FIRMS),  gross state product (GSP), 
and personal income (PINC).  Square miles (SQMILES) and population (POP) are 
included to control for site price and availability.  Also included is the 
effective state corporate tax rate (TAX)  .6  We control for population by 
entering it directly into our equation rather than by using per capita 
variables that would impose additional structure. 
Bank data are obtained from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports) for 1980 and 1984.  (For the 1980-82  period,  we assume 
that the lagged 1980  variables on  banking are exogenous to firm births 
occurring between 1980 and 1982.  A similar assumption is made for the 1984-86 
period.)  Measures of bank structure and profitability are created by 
aggregating data from individual  banks up to the SMSA level.  The total amount 
of loans and leases (LOANS) is a measure of the level of bank intermediation. 
The average rate of return (RETURN),  income divided by assets,  measures the 
resources available for future lending and the health of the banking 
sector.7  This variable may also be measuring the effects of bank structure 
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and the general economic health of the region.  The empirical analysis will 
thus explicitly control for these effects. 
We employ standard measures of market structure,  such as the total 
number of banks (HQS) and branches (BRANCH),  the number of bank employees per 
bank (BANKEMP), and a Herfindahl index of the concentration of deposits 
(HERF)  .  We also include a measure of bank entry (ENTRY),  the percentage 
net change in the number of banks from 1978 to 1980,  and from 1982 to 1984, 
for the respective periods.  9 
Our last measures of bank structure are a set of variables 
(SIZE1-SIZE6)  that control for the size of banks.  SIZE1-SIZE6  are the 
proportion of banks with assets (in $  millions) of $0-25,  $25-50,  $50-75, 
$75-100,  $100-250,  and $250-400. The omitted category in our estimations is 
the proportion of banks with assets over $30  million.  Summary statistics for 
these variables are presented in table 1. 
A pervasive problem with using this data to examine how banking 
activity affects the regional economy is that regions for which data are 
collected (SMSAs and states) and economic regions do not necessarily match. 
In addition,  for some variables, such as LOANS, although the total dollar 
value of loans is known,  it is not possible to determine where these loans 
were made.  For example, loans made by an Ohio bank to firms in Florida and 
Ohio are counted in the same way. 
With the banking data,  an additional measurement problem is that a 
Call Report for a consolidated banking unit may include data for branches not 
located in the SMSA.  In states that allow branch banking,  activity at the 
branches may be reported solely in the headquarters SMSA.  In a preliminary 
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study,  we tested the sensitivity of our full sample results to this potential 
errors-in-variables  problem in several ways, first by running the model 
without SMSAs in states that have unrestricted branch banking, and then  by 
running it again without SMSAs in states that allow any type of branch 
banking.  lo The results  , however,  were qualitatively similar to those 
reported here.  A more stringent test,  which we employ in this paper,  controls 
for state-level  fixed effects.  This specification relies on variation  within 
states and across time to identify the effects of local banking markets. 
111. Estimation and Results 
Pooled Sample Results 
Estimates of variations of the above model for the full sample are 
presented in table 2.  Column 1 lists the estimates of a basic model of firm 
location.  Here, the probability that a firm birth will occur depends on the 
wages, taxes,  number of establishments,  and population.  This set of variables 
differs somewhat from that employed by Carlton (1979),  who also uses the 
unionization rate and energy prices in  his estimates for selected industries. 
Eberts and Stone (1987) find that energy prices do not matter when the model 
is estimated with aggregate manufacturing data.  In  our study,  which considers 
all industries,  it is even less likely that energy prices would matter. 
Because we are not concerned about differences across industries and are 
interested only in whether there are statistically significant effects on 
aggregate regional economic activity as a result of bank structure and 
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not included because data were unavailable.  We assume that unionization is 
not systematically related to the banking variables. 
All of the coefficients in column 1 are statistically significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level.  As expected,  we find that higher wages and 
higher effective corporate tax rates reduce the probability of firm births in 
an SMSA.  Also, the probability of firm births increases with a greater number 
of establishments (FIRMS) and a lower population.  Although the coefficient on 
population is somewhat unexpected, this result suggests that given the similar 
magnitude and opposite signs of these two coefficients,  perhaps the number of 
firms per capita is the appropriate regressor.  We continue entering 
population as a separate regressor because this is the least restrictive way 
of including population in the model.  11 
Column 2 presents estimates of a similar model that includes measures 
of bank structure and profitability.  The addition of the bank structure 
variables did not affect the estimates of the basic firm location variables. 
The first three coefficients have roughly the same magnitude and remain 
statistically significant.  Yet,  the addition of the measures of bank 
structure and profitability does help explain variations in firm births 
across regions. 
The measure of the total amount of financial intermediation (LOANS) is 
negative and statistically significant.  The RETURN variable has a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient,  suggesting that (controlling for 
structure) a profitable banking sector is associated with a higher probability 
of firm births.  Profitable banks may have more opportunities for providing 
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intermediation  services and may engage in less credit rationing, suggesting a 
positive relationship with firm births.  Alternatively, high profits in the 
banking sector could merely be indicating profitable market conditions for 
other industries as well.  (We therefore control for regional economic 
activity in the estimates presented in column 3.) 
The number of banks (HQS) is statistically significant,  as are 
BRANCHES, BANKEMP, and HERF,  suggesting that the greater the number of 
branches and the more concentrated the banking market (at least as measured by 
HERF),  the lower the probability of firm births.  More branches could reflect 
a greater retail orientation of the banks.  Also, the more employees per bank, 
the higher the probability of firm births. 
The statistical significance and the magnitude of SIZE1, SIZES,  and 
SIZE4 suggest that smaller banks are more involved in firm births than are 
larger  banks: the higher the proportion of small banks, the higher the 
probability of firm births.  Last, the coefficient on ENTRY is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that the more contestable the banking 
market (as indicated by a larger value for ENTRY),  the higher the probability 
of firm births. 
We also enter dummy variables to control for state regulations.  UNIT 
equals 1 for states with unit banking.  STWIDE equals 1 for states with 
statewide branching.  The omitted category is states with limited branching. 
The results suggest that firm births in states permitting statewide branching 
are significantly higher than in both limited branching states and unit 
banking states.  This is consistent with Eisenbeis' (1985) characterization of 
previous evidence. 
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Two more measures of regional activity (PINC and GSP) are added to the 
model in column 3 to determine whether the bank structure and profitability 
effects are merely reflecting regional economic conditions.  Of the added 
regressors,  only GSP is statistically significant.  The bank-related 
coefficient estimates do not change appreciably with the addition of these 
regressors.  In  particular, RETURN retains its positive and statistically 
significant  value even  when we control as much as possible for local economic 
conditions, suggesting that this variable is doing more than just reflecting a 
robust local economy. 
As previously discussed,  the banking data are subject to measurement 
error.  In states that permit statewide banking,  a Call Report for a 
consolidated banking unit may include data for branches not located in the 
SMSA.  While the standard errors-in-variables  problem in econometrics results 
in a bias toward zero in the estimated coefficients,  elsewhere (using only 
the data for the first time period) we tested whether our results were 
sensitive to this type of measurement error (see Bauer and Cromwell [1989]). 
We estimated the model excluding SMSAs in states that have statewide branch 
banking, and then again excluding SMSAs in states that allow statewide or 
limited  branch banking.  The results were robust across these specifications. 
To further test if our results are being driven by some unobservable 
error or fixed effect associated with state-specific  regulations,  we ran our 
model with a set of dummy variables for all states.  Note that this estimation 
relies solely on  variation among SMSAs within states,  and on  variation within 
SMSAs over time.  An F test on the set of fixed-effects  dummy variables 
overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance.  The F 
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statistic was 39.7 with 46 and 434  degrees of freedom.  As shown in column 4 
of table 2,  our basic results hold.  A higher level of firm births is 
associated with a higher rate of profitability, a lower level of 
concentration,  and a higher proportion of small banks.  RETURN,  HERF,  SIZE3, 
SIZE4,  and SIZE6 are all statistically significant.  ENTRY,  however,  loses its 
statistical significance. 
Cross-Sectional  Results 
Estimating the model on the pooled sample expands our degrees of 
freedom and permits more efficient estimation through exploitation of the 
error structure over time.  Furthermore,  as we showed,  the panel nature of the 
data also allows us to control for unobserved fixed effects that  could be 
biasing our estimates.  The cost of the pooled estimation,  however, is that it 
imposes the same structural coefficients in different time periods.  Given 
that our first period is during a severe recession,  and our second is during 
an expansion,  we can test the effect of  business cycles on the model by 
running it on the two separate cross-sections. 
The cross-sectional  results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 
2.  In general, the results suggest that local bank structure and 
profitability are more important in a recession period--perhaps  when national 
credit-market  constraints are binding--than  during an expansion,  when sources 
of credit and capital outside the local market are more readily available. 
Almost all of the bank structure variables are statistically significant in 
the 1980-82  period in column 5.  Again,  controlling for profitability and 
regional economic strength,  a higher rate of firm births is associated  with 
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lower levels of concentration,  a higher proportion of small banks,  and easier 
entry into the local market. 
During the expansion period of 1984-86,  however,  bank structure 
appears to have less of an effect.  In column 6,  HQs,  BRANCHES, BANKEMP, and 
SIZE1 remain statistically significant.  However, the estimated coefficients 
for RETURN,  HERF,  and ENTRY decline in magnitude and lose their statistical 
significance.  Profitability and concentration of the local banking market 
appear to matter less in expansions. 
IV. Conclusion 
This study presents evidence on the effects of bank structure and 
profitability on the births of new firms.  The attraction of new firms is an 
important goal of local economic development policies, which often provide 
public-sector  financial incentives.  Private-sector  financial structure, 
however,  potentially influences firm location through the price and 
availability of credit from commercial banks. 
The empirical analysis examines the relationship between banking 
activity and regional development during two periods, 1980-82  and 1984-86. 
Using bank-level  data,  we construct measures of lending,  profitability, 
concentration, size,  and entry in the banking sectors of 252 SMSAs.  Measures 
of bank structure are included in a standard model of firm location in order 
to test for independent effects of banking on regional growth as measured by 
firm births. 
As with other firm location studies,  we find that firm births are 
positively associated with low wages, low taxes,  and a large number of 
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existing firms.  Our analysis,  however,  also shows that the private banking 
sector appears to be systematically related to the probability of firm births. 
Higher rates of firm openings are associated with a healthy and competitive 
banking sector.  Specifically,  firm births are associated with higher rates of 
bank profits, higher numbers of bank employees, lower levels of concentration, 
higher proportions of small banks, and higher rates of entry of new banks into 
the SMSA.  Cross-sectional  results,  however,  suggest that these effects are 
most important in times of economic recession,  when national credit markets 
may be constrained. 
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See Elliehausen and Wolken (1990). 
Small Business Administration (1985), p. 206. 
Gertler (1988) provides an overall review.  Bernanke (1983) argues that 
extensive bank runs and defaults in the 1930-1933  financial crisis reduced the 
efficiency of the financial sector in performing its intermediation function 
and that this had adverse effects on real output.  Gilbert and Kochin (1989) 
find that closing banks has adverse effects on local sales and nonagricultural 
employment.  The literature on financial structure and economic development 
has principally focused on variations across countries.  Gurley and Shaw 
(1955) emphasize the role of intermediaries in the credit supply process. 
They note that in more developed countries,  an organized system of financial 
intermediation improves the efficiency of intertemporal trade and promotes 
general economic activity.  The correlation between economic development and 
financial sophistication across time and across countries has often been 
noted.  See Goldsmith (1969) and Cameron (1972) for examples of such studies. 
In virtually every case,  the estimated parameters are of a similar sign, 
magnitude, and level of significance. 
USELM stands for the U.  S. Establishment and Longitudinal Microdata file 
constructed for the Small Business Administration by Dun and Bradstreet. 
WAGE and TAX are 1977 variables from the Census of Manufactures.  GSP, 
PINC,  and POP are 1980 variables from the Census Bureau and the Department of 
Commerce.  FIRMS is a 1980  variable from the USELM data. 
Specifications using income divided by equity capital yield similar 
results. 
The Herf  indahl index is defined as the sum of the square of each bank's 
share of deposits for a given SMSA. 
Note that this measure treats entry and exit symmetrically. 
lo  For details, see Bauer and Cromwell (1989). 








TAX (effective tax rate) 
FIRMS (number of 
establishments) 
LOANS (total loans 
and leases,  millions) 
RETURN (net income to assets) 
HQS (number of  banks) 




SIZE1 (percent of banks with 
$0-$25  million assets) 
SIZE2 (percent of banks with 
$25-$50  million assets) 
SIZE3 (percent of banks with 
$50-$75  million assets) 
SIZE4 (percent of banks with 
$75-$100  million assets) 
SIZE5 (percent of banks with 
$100-$250  million assets) 
SIZE6 (percent of banks with 
$250-$400  million assets) 
ENTRY (percentage change 
in the number of banks) 
SQMILES (square miles of the 
metropolitan area) 
POP (population,  thousands) 
PINC (personal income, 
thousands) 
GSP (gross state 
product,  millions) 
STWIDE (allow statewide 
branching) 
UNIT (unit branching states) 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
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Estimation Results 
Coefficient  (1) 
WAGE 
TAX 
FIRMS  0.1208~ 
(0.0353) 
LOANS  .  .  . 
.  .  . 
RETURN  . . . 
. . . 
BRANCHES  ... 
.  .  . 
BANKEMP  ... 
.  .  . 
HERF  ... 
... 
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Estimation Results 
Coefficient  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(1980-82)  (1984-86) 
ENTRY 
SQMILES  0.1589~  0.1377~  0.1490~ 0.0315~  0.1519~  0.089ga 




CONSTANT  -4.6532a  -4.5331a  -5.4103~  -4.  3273a  -7  .6584a  -1.7598 
(0.1490)  (0.2822)  (0.6464)  (0.9585)  (1.5809)  (1.4100) 
Log likelihood 
function  -131.0620  -171.7270  -168.8590  325.5410  -27.0013  16.0035 
Buse R-Square  0.9152  0.9280  0.9236  0.9939  0.5314  0.4117 
No. of  obs.  5  04  5  04  504  504  252  252 
a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
b. Significant at the 90  percent confidence level. 
NOTE: Standard errors of the coefficients appear in  parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations. 
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